10 Institutional order
J.L. Austin, Ho to do things with words
http://www.dwrl.utexas.edu/~davis/crs/rhe321/Austin-How-To-Do-Things.pdf
Who is Austin?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._L._Austin
http://www.iep.utm.edu/austin/
John Searle, What is a speech act
Download pdf
Who is Searle?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Searle
Pierre Bourdieu, The social conditions for the effectiveness of ritual discourse (1975)
On Speech Act Theory you must consult:
Marina Sbisà, Speech acts in context (2002)
Marina Sbisà, Speech acts theory (2006)
Marina Sbisà, How to read Austin (2007)
Other interesting articles by Marina Sbisà in ITALIAN:
J.L. Austin e la teoria degli atti linguistici (ppt presentation)
Atto/Act
Marina Sbisà's home page:
http://www2.units.it/sbisama/it/?file=scritti.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Searle
Pierre Bourdieu, The social conditions for the effectiveness of ritual discourse (1975)
On Speech Act Theory you must consult:
Marina Sbisà, Speech acts in context (2002)
Marina Sbisà, Speech acts theory (2006)
Marina Sbisà, How to read Austin (2007)
Other interesting articles by Marina Sbisà in ITALIAN:
J.L. Austin e la teoria degli atti linguistici (ppt presentation)
Atto/Act
Marina Sbisà's home page:
http://www2.units.it/sbisama/it/?file=scritti.htm
John Searle, What is a speech act
RispondiEliminaThe American philosopher Searle tackles the concept of “Speech Act” in specific “illocutionary act” which is a term introduced by Austin a British philosopher in the 70th. Searle starts with the basic definition of what’s speech as mean to later question weather is speech an act? Where, he argues in favor of it being an act. His argument is against other philosophers who don’t really perceive speech as form of action. His argument start with first defining that illocutionary act is the differentiation of meaning of words under different circumstance. So in a sense we can’t assume that speech act is natural phenomena but in fact a consequence of organized or governed behavior. In another terms, that in speech we tend to act without noticing the unsaid words or always clearly stating the intention even though they are unwritten rule in a sense.
This argument was supported with three main notions; rules, propositions and meaning. In his discussion about the first notion “rules”, Searle argues there are two set of rules 1. “Constitutive rules”, and 2. formal set of rule “regulative rules”. He explain the constitutive rules are not a must to have in order for certain function or activity to occur and he uses the example that etiquette is a constitutive rule for relationships however relationships can indeed occurs without the existence of etiquette. On the other hand, he express regulative rule, as the rules that without them the whole paradigm can’t exist such as football rules.
In the second notion “ propositions”, he start illustrating with example how sentences with similar content can convey different messages without the objective being literally stated but can be understood in how the sentence is constructed and used. In the third notion “meanings” he links it with an in depth on the hypothesis of making a promise and where the illocutionary act fit in different scenarios taking into account intention, context, and other factors.
What is a speech act - J. Searle
RispondiEliminaThe main point of this passage is that a language has a speech act or an illocutionary act. According to Searle (who is mainly reproducing J.L. Austin's perceptions) illocutionary act is the production of a token during the process of a speech act, or in other words the verbal expression of specific attitude.
He is also trying to distinguish the different circumstances where the illocutionary act is used: in forms of "assertions" but not "propositions", since the second is "not act at all although the act of expressing a proposition is part of performing certain illocutionary acts.” Moreover Searle highlights the notion of illocutionary act by illocutionary act by stating a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the performance of a particular kind of illocutionary act, and extracting from it a set of semantical rules of the use of the expression.
What is a Speech Act? John Searle
RispondiEliminaIllocutionary act is the minimal unit of linguistic communication. To perform illocutionary acts is to engage in a rule-governed form of behavior.
3 preliminary notions: rules, propositions, and meaning
1)two RULES. the first regulate antecedently existing forms of behavior (regulative rules); the second create or define new forms of behavior (constitutive rules).
The hypothesis is that the semantics of a language can be regarded as a series of systems of constitutive rules and that illocutionary acts are acts performed in accordance with these sets of constitutive rules.
2)PROPOSITION.S distinguishes between the illocutionary act and the propositional content of an illocutionary act. The sentence has two (not necessarily separate) parts, the proposition indicating element and the function indicating device;
3)MEANING. In speaking a language I attempt to communicate things to my hearer by means of getting him to recognize my intention to communicate just those things.
Illocutionary act of promising: the idea is get such a set of conditions we can extract from them a set of rules for the use of the function indicating device. These condition are:
(1) Normal Input and Output Conditions obtain. ‘Output’ covers the conditions for intelligible speaking and ‘input’ covers the conditions for understanding. Together they include such things as that the speaker and hearer both know how to speak the language
(2) Speakers expresses that promise in the utterance of sentence. This condition isolates the propositional content from the rest of the speech act.
(3) In expressing that promise, Speakers predicates a future act A of Speaker. In the case of promising the unction indicating device is an expression whose scope includes certain features of the proposition. S. call conditions (2) and (3) the propositional content conditions.
(4) Hearer would prefer Speakers’s doing A to his not doing A, and Speakers believes Hearer would
prefer his doing A to his not doing A.
(5) It is not obvious to both Speakers and Hearer that Speakers will do A in the normal course of events. S. call conditions such as (4) and (5) preparatory conditions.
(6) Speakers intends to do A. This is the sincerity condition.
(7) Speakers intends that the utterance of sentence will place him under an obligation to do A. This is the essential condition
(8) Speakers intends that the utterance of sentence will produce in Hearer a belief that conditions (6) and (7) obtain by means of the recognition of the intention to produce that belief, and he intends this recognition to be achieved by means of the recognition of the sentence as one conventionally used to produce such beliefs.
(9) The semantical rules of the dialect spoken by Speakers and Hearer are such that sentence is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if conditions (1)—(8) obtain.
From these set of conditions S. extract a set of rules for the use of the function indicating device.
Rule1(propositional content rule). Promise is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence the utterance of which predicates some future act A of the speaker.
Rule2 (preparatory rules) Promise is to be uttered only if the hearer would prefer Speakers ’s doing A to his not doing A, and Speakers believes hearer would prefer Speakers’s doing A to his not doing A.
Rule3 (preparatory rules). Promise is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both Speakers and hearer that Speakers will do A in the normal course of events.
Rule 4(sincerity rule) Promise is to be uttered only if Speaker intends to do A.
Rule 5(essential rule.)The utterance of promise counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A.
Talking is always acting?
RispondiEliminaHow to read Austin
Marina Sbisá
For this unit, caught my attention the work of Sbisá, when she invite us to reevaluating four assumptions that commonly attributed to Austin’s studies at your main work: “How to Do Things with Words”.
1. That the Austin´s book was written in pursuit of performatives:
Sbisá says that is not correct, Austin support the analysis of the division by performative action (Locutionary-Illocutionary-Perlocutionary), from the performative/constative distinction. For understand the perfomative analysis and its “extralinguistic consequences”, you need the tools provided for this division, in an instrumental and illustrative way.
2. That for Austin, performing an illocutionary act amounts to producing the uptake of the meaning and force of the utterance.
For Sbisá, the illocutionary acts no meaning the production of the sound with mean for the human ear. Because for Austin, the emisor of the speeach can not warrant the same idea on the receptor that the emisor can say. The receptor must have “catch” the meaning and the level of the expression on the emisor´s act. For that, the study of the illocutionary act is deeper that the study of the send- receive message´s production. Is just perfect for understand this, the example of the named a ship.
3. That for Austin, performing a perlocutionary act amounts to using language to produce consequences.
By Sbisá, the idea of Austin about the illocution, is related to the intention of the phrase, and the perlocution is more like the behavior that causes the phrase. But, it isn’t meaning that the perlocutionary act is an act of the receptor, because for Austin, the actions basically are “gestures of an individual, intentionally performed” so, this work is mainly an emisor´s labor.
4. Austin’s theory unduly excludes “non-serious” speech acts.
For Sbisá, this is not true, it´s just that the non- serious act is a part of the most big studies, but Austin study that forms of speech too. In fact, Austin call this acts “aetiolation”, and related this an important issue for he: the idea of the matter the intention of the actor when says something. Is very successful the conception of “pretended” act.
For me, this paper implies that Austin´s work give to a authority role in a communication project, with different consequences, also politic and cultural; when Sbisá says that Austin: “gives us insights into the capacity of mankind for creating shared environments through language, not as a matter of transmitting anything from one head to the other or of causally influencing each other's mental states, but as a matter of establishing situations and roles and attributing local statuses to participants. Herein lies the power of human civilisation as opposed to “state of nature”; (…)To acknowledge in theory and investigate such power is at the same time to foster it and defend it against the risk of regression into forms of social life based on brute force and coercion”. For me, this imply that the important role of the talking and the important contribution by elements like democracy or liberty.
Bourdieu ‘s Authorized Language: the Social Conditions for the Effectiveness of Ritual discourse
RispondiEliminaBourdieu criticized Autin and Habermas in their claim that the power of words can be found within the words. Bourdieu states the opposite, that the power of words- is not within the words but is in the delegated power of the spokesperson, in his/her discourse.
Bourdieu states that power is not in the linguistic substance of speech. He further explains that authority comes to language from outside.
I think Bourdieu refer as authorized language the language coming from powerful discourses- of the legal, medical, scientific, religious discourses. For instance, when the sentence “I now pronounce you husband and wife” is said, an action is performed. The effectiveness of this sentence did not come from the words themselves, but by the whole condition required to perform this ‘ritual.’
The use of language, how you use it, what is the content, is related to the social position of the speaker. The speaker is an authorized representative to perform action with their words. Their access to the legitimate discourses gives power to their discourses.
The stylistic feature of the language is also connected to the position of the speakers in a society (priests, teachers, doctors, etc.). The speaker’s style, rhetoric already gives his speech some connotations.
In speaking, a person is already employing his/her linguistic resources to fit the needs of the audience. With this, he/she is already maintaining a social relation. For example, a scientist will say that ‘a landslide is a kind of mass wasting. It has a source, velocity, amount of displaced material and evidences (hummocks).’ This statement functions as a legitimate source of knowledge for disaster risk management. It could suggest roles of people (scientists to produce knowledge about the landslide, politicians to make programs out of it, community people to follow these programs). In this case, a social order is maintained.
“The performative utterance is destined to fail each time it is not pronounced by a person who has the ‘power’ to pronounce it.” (Bourdieu 1975:111). It should also be done in an appropriate context/ritual.
In summary, in order for words to be effective/to have a power, these conditions should be satisfied: the speaker must be a legitimate user of the word; the words should be uttered in a legitimate situation; and these acts must be recognized by the listeners.